Several observers have already praised incoming Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto as the next great foreign policy hope for his country. They believe he will be more hands-on in managing foreign and defence policy than his predecessor, Joko Widodo. Prabowo’s various overseas visits from April through September saw him meeting heads of state and his defence minister counterparts, partly for him to personally invite some of them to attend his presidential inauguration on Sunday.
Widodo was conspicuously absent from last week’s Asean summit in Vientiane, Laos, and roundly criticised for a missed opportunity to assert Indonesia’s influence and reassure others that Asean remains a cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. Widodo sent his vice-president as his representative to the summit meetings, a decision that sealed his reputation as someone disinterested in foreign policy, something already clear from his first years as president.
Prabowo Subianto with running mate Gibran Rakabuming Raka at the General Election Commission headquarters in Jakarta in April. Photo: Reuters
Widodo’s absence was an unnecessary own goal that added to the long-standing perception that Indonesia punches below its weight as Southeast Asia’s largest country. By the Lowy Institute’s latest Asia Power Index, in terms of material resources and “influence”, Indonesia ranked ninth out of 27 countries in “comprehensive power”, below Singapore. Indonesia supports the international rules-based order and is an active player in Asean, yet Widodo’s inattention and fast-moving geopolitics have contributed to a sense of stagnation. Indonesia introduced the Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific concept in 2019 to buttress Asean centrality, but some scholars warn that this is now threatened by competing visions for regional order, embodied by other minilateral arrangements. Widodo’s “global maritime fulcrum” idea, released with fanfare when he first became president, was moribund by the start of his second term and a missed opportunity to secure Indonesia’s position as a maritime power.
As Prabowo takes over, three key areas bear watching: positioning, preoccupations and personalities.
The first issue is how Prabowo wishes to position Indonesia, vis-a-vis not just the US and China but also powers like Russia, Japan and the European Union. Most commentators and scholars see Prabowo as an arch nationalist and a realist who believes that wealth and military might undergird a country’s prosperity in an anarchical world. In his presidential debates and subsequent statements, he has interpreted Indonesia’s long-standing foreign policy motto bebas aktif, or “free and independent” in Bahasa Indonesia, to mean that Indonesia will be a “good neighbour” – continuing the “many friends, zero enemies” posture of the two presidents before him. He is also a pragmatist: Prabowo’s foreign trips reflect his willingness to meet diverse partners in Asia and Europe to shore up Indonesia’s positions in trade, defence, security and other areas, although some predict possible tensions given his past rhetoric against issues like the EU’s sanctions on palm oil.
Chinese President Xi Jinping with Prabowo in Beijing in April. Photo: China Daily via Reuters
As defence minister, Prabowo strengthened Indonesia’s defence diplomacy by signing various pacts with partners like Singapore and Australia to improve and support the Indonesian military (TNI). Some criticised his approach as scattershot and transactional, and the TNI has not reached its “minimum essential force” goal, but Prabowo had inherited a dismal situation created by decades of underinvestment. As president, Prabowo will continue to emphasise defence cooperation, including with smaller neighbours like Brunei and by giving arms and aid to Cambodia, while privileging defence relationships with bigger powers. He might also try to level up Indonesia’s defence industry, which faced various challenges under Widodo.
