PRESIDENT Donald Trump’s declaration that the United States will “run” Venezuela following the arrest of Nicolás Maduro and his wife marks one of the most consequential moments in contemporary international politics.
It is not merely a dramatic episode in Latin America. It is a signal that the norms governing sovereignty, intervention and post-conflict governance are being fundamentally re-written.
The decision, as reported by The Wall Street Journal, represents a striking reversal of Trump’s earlier aversion to nation-building.
During his first presidency, Trump repeatedly criticised America’s costly engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Yet in Venezuela, he has openly embraced the language of custodianship, declaring that Washington will oversee the country’s transition until it is deemed “safe” and “proper”.
Such candour is rare — and unsettling. The United States did not simply pressure a regime, impose sanctions, or broker negotiations.
It executed a military operation, captured a sitting head of state, and announced an open-ended role in governing another sovereign country.
Whether one views Maduro as a failed autocrat or an illegitimate ruler is not the central issue.
The core concern lies in the precedent: the normalisation of direct external control as a tool of political transition.
For countries in Asia, particularly those shaped by colonial histories, this development deserves close scrutiny. Southeast Asia’s diplomatic culture has long prioritised sovereignty and non-intervention.
These principles, embedded in Asean’s political DNA, are often criticised as conservative or overly cautious.
Yet they exist for a reason. They reflect historical memory — that foreign-imposed solutions, however well-intentioned, frequently generate instability rather than legitimacy.
Trump’s Venezuela move challenges this restraint head-on. It suggests that sovereignty is conditional, subject to reinterpretation by powerful states when strategic interests align with moral narratives.
The justification offered — that Venezuela cannot be trusted to manage its own transition — echoes a familiar logic once used to rationalise prolonged interventions elsewhere.
History offers sobering lessons. Nation-building is rarely swift or clean. It is politically messy, economically draining, and socially destabilising.
Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated how external control, even when backed by overwhelming military power, struggles to produce sustainable governance.
Venezuela, with its fractured political opposition, weakened institutions and deep social polarisation, presents no easier terrain.
There is also the question of legality. The absence of explicit United Nations authorisation places the operation in a grey zone of international law.
While Washington points to domestic indictments against Maduro to legitimise its actions, the leap from prosecution to occupation stretches existing legal frameworks.
For smaller states, this blurring of law and power is deeply troubling. Asia cannot afford to view this episode as geographically distant or strategically irrelevant. Great powers learn from precedent.
If the Venezuela model is perceived as effective — or at least manageable — it may embolden similar actions elsewhere under the banner of “stability” or “transition management”.
The criteria for intervention then become subjective, shaped less by international consensus than by unilateral judgment. This is particularly concerning for medium and small powers.
When rules weaken, asymmetry matters more. States without overwhelming military or economic leverage depend disproportionately on norms, institutions and predictability.
The erosion of these safeguards leaves them exposed to external pressure, even when intervention is framed in benevolent terms.
There is also an economic dimension. Venezuela’s vast oil reserves are impossible to separate from the political calculus.
Statements suggesting a prominent role for American energy firms reinforce perceptions that strategic resources remain intertwined with geopolitical decision-making.
For energy-importing regions like Asia, this raises questions about how power and access may be exercised in future crises.
At a deeper level, Trump’s move reflects a broader transformation in global politics: the return of executive dominance and spectacle.
Decisions of immense international consequence are announced with minimal consultation, bypassing multilateral institutions and compressing diplomacy into performative declarations.
Power is asserted first; justification follows later. This environment places a premium on strategic clarity for Asian states.
The lesson is not that intervention will suddenly become universal, but that restraint can no longer be assumed. Sovereignty must be actively defended — diplomatically, legally and collectively.
Regional cohesion, whether through Asean or broader multilateral forums, becomes more important, not less, when global norms are under strain.
Trump’s gamble in Venezuela may yet unravel under its own weight. Or it may persist, reshaping expectations about what powerful states can do when patience runs out. Either outcome carries implications far beyond Caracas.
For Asia, the message is clear. The international order is entering a phase where rules are increasingly contingent, and power is increasingly explicit.
Navigating this reality will require prudence, unity and a renewed commitment to principles that protect the weak as much as they restrain the strong.
*The writer is Director at the Institute of International and Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia
© New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd